Luận văn An investigation into the role of metaphor in description of emotions in English poetic disscourse

process (a verb, fail, and its participants, He + the exam) is not realized by means of a clause, but rather by means of another type of form, such as a noun phrase, as in the example at hand. In this sense, grammatical metaphor again involves a type of metaphorical movement: from a process as clause (the default encoding of a process) to a process as noun phrase. Grammatical metaphor is thus based on the variation between something common, standard, default (i.e. a process realized as a clause) and something which is extended from that (i.e. a process realized by some other form, e.g. a noun phrase), and in this sense grammatical metaphor is similar to the traditional type of metaphor looked at above. However, in the case of grammatical metaphor, the two aspects involved in the movement or metaphorical extension no longer refer to lexemes and lexical meanings (as with lexical metaphor). Rather, they refer to grammatical forms, or grammatical means of expression, such as a clause and a nominal group. According to Halliday, grammatical metaphor is conceived as an incongruent realization of a given semantic configuration in the lexicogrammar ( 1985: 321) 4 Classification of grammatical metaphor In general, there are four kinds of grammartical metaphor: ideational (experiential), interpersonal, , logical and. textual. They occur when the usual or ‘congruent’ realization of meaning is given a ‘non congruent’ or metaphorical expression. The ideational grammatical metaphor relates to the experiential meaning, the logical metaphor to the textual meaning and the interpersonal metaphor to the interpersonal meaning. 4.1 Congruent realization of meaning SFL describes the congruent form of representing experience like this: Example 1: Congruent realization of meaning (1) He is furious because his wife has been kidnapped. In the following example we have a more incongruent form of representing reality through a grammatical metaphor: Example 2: Incongruent realization of meaning: grammatical metaphor (2) He is in a flood of anger because his wife has been kidnapped. Why consider this a metaphorical expression? The answer relies on the acceptance of the notion that the congruent form is the unmarked way we represent experience and that the alternative or marked realization is a form of metaphor. Congruent Metaphorical 1. Adjective (Qualifier) Noun (Entity) 2. Verb (Process) Noun (Entity) 3. Verb (Process) Adjective (Qualifier) 4. Adverb (Circumstance) Adjective (Qualifier) 5.Conjunction (Relator) Prepositional Phrase ( Circumstance) Table 2 - Class shift (semantic type) ( Adapted from Halliday 1995) 4.2 Logical grammatical metaphor Logical grammatical metaphor refers to the consideration of meaning in an incongruent way at the level of the organization of the discourse. The most congruent form of joining two ideas is with a conjunction but when conjunctions are realized through processes and nouns allowing for two or more clauses to become one, it is referred as a logical grammatical metaphor. In spoken medium the logico-semantic relations such as cause-effect are more commonly realized by conjunctions. This type of metaphor is called ‘ logical metaphor’ because it involves what Martin (1993) calls ‘buried reasoning’, or the metaphorical realization of the logico-semantic relations such as cause and effect that in a less metaphorical realization would be expressed by the conjunctions. This metaphorical realization of conjunctive relations by processes like ‘resulting’, ‘causing’, ‘depending’, etc. and nominal groups like ‘ classifier’, ‘qualifier’, ‘numerative’ , etc. 4. 3 Ideational grammatical metaphor The examples given in 3, which are repeated here for ease of reference, have been described as illustrating a metaphorical shift from process as clause to process as noun phrase: 1. His failure in the exam surprised me. In the systemic functional model of language, the notion of a ‘process’ belongs to the ideational metafunction: a ‘process’ is one aspect by which we represent and shape the reality we live in as human beings. In the previous section, ‘process’ has been mentioned as complementary to other ideational notions, viz. ‘entity’ and ‘quality’. With these notions in mind, the nature of the metaphors in (1) and (2) can now be further explained. We have seen above that, in Halliday’s view, a process is normally expressed by means of a clause, but it can metaphorically be expressed by means of a noun phrase. What is important is that a noun phrase is also the ‘normal’ (i.e. default, standard) expression of some other ideational type of meaning, viz. an entity. An entity is normally expressed by means of noun phrase: a table, the sun, my sister, joy, eight books. In this sense, in example (1), the form ‘noun phrase’ is borrowed to metaphorically express the meaning of a process, in the same sense as the lexica; in example (4) (repeated here) borrows the lexeme grasp to express the meaning ‘understand’: (4) He didn’t grasp it. The form of a noun phrase can be borrowed to express processes (which are normally realized by means of clauses), but it can also be used metaphorically to express qualities, which are by default encoded by adjectives. In this sense, (6) is a metaphorical variant of (5). (5) She is dishonest. (6) You cannot really count on her honesty. Another common sub-type of ideational metaphor is where a process (normally expressed by means of clause) comes to be expressed by means of an adjective, and thus, comes to be conceived of as a quality instead. Ideational metaphor is a powerful resource in the grammar of a language, by which the expression of ideational meanings such as processes, qualities and entities is extended in important ways beyond their default encodings as clauses, adjectives and nouns (or noun phrases) respectively: different forms can be borrowed to express different meanings. 4.4 .Interpersonal grammatical metaphor The main function of the ideational grammatical metaphor is to condense the information as a way to pack more lexical items in one clause at the expense of deleting the participants and time of the processes, i.e. the ideational grammatical metaphor is a more metaphorical way of expressing the meaning at the level of experience. The interpersonal grammatical metaphor, on the other hand, can be described as a metaphorical way to express interpersonal meanings that are congruently represented in mood and modality choices. The use of this kind of grammatical metaphor is especially important in language as they allow for a more explicit or implicit presence of the writer/speaker in the discourse The interpersonal component of grammar especially concerns the areas of modality and mood. In these two areas, Halliday also distinguishes between basic, non-metaphorical expressions, and metaphorical ones, i.e. inter- personal metaphors. Let us look at each area in turn. A default realization of a modal meaning, for example, a degree of certainty, according to Halliday, is by means of modal elements that occur within the clause that is being modally evaluated. For example, in order to express the likelihood of John having left already, we can use a modal verb such as must (9) and/or a modal adverb such as certainly (10): (9) John must have left (, because the lights are off). (10) John will certainly have left by now. Halliday calls these expressions of modality, which occur within the clause structure itself, the basic type. However, the same meaning of likelihood with a high degree of certainty can also be expressed by adding more elements to the initial clause John + have left. The following examples illustrate just a few possibilities: a. I think John has already left. b. It is very likely that John has already left. c. Everyone believed that John had already left. d. It is clear that John has already left. In each of the examples above, the modal meaning (i.e. a high degree of certainty that something is the case) is expressed by elements which lie outside the original clause, and which are based on particular types of verbs, such as think (a) or believe (c), or particular types of adjectives, such as likely (b) or clear (d). Halliday calls such expressions interpersonal metaphors of modality, because the modal meaning is realized outside the clause (in contrast with the standard encoding by means of modal verbs or adverbs, which lie within the clause structure). In this case, again, the metaphors are based on a borrowing: for example the verb think can be borrowed to express a modal meaning, as in example (a). The second interpersonal area in grammar, according to systemic functional linguistics, is that of mood. In order to understand the notion of interpersonal metaphors of mood, it is necessary to consider, again, what the default types of encoding are. With regard to mood, Halliday distinguishes three major types of interactive functions: statements are expressions which give information, questions are expressions which ask information, and commands are expressions which ask for something to take place. Each of these functions has its standard, default type of encoding: statements are encoded by the declarative, questions by the interrogative, and commands by the imperative, as we have seen in examples (2)–(4) above. The expression of statements and questions is fairly straightforward, but with regard to commands, the situation is different. There is a large variety of expressions that can be used to express the same command: (11) Send your proposal by email, please. (12) a. Could you send your proposal by email, please ? b. I would advise you to send it by email. c. You are kindly requested to send your proposal by email. d. It is recommended that you send your proposal by email. e. It is advisable to send your proposal by email. The examples in (11) are different metaphorical variants of expressing a command that can also be expressed, in its most straightforward, standard way, as an imperative (11). The metaphorical examples in (12) include the interrogative mood type (which is the standard expression of requests for information), and the declarative mood type (which normally, i.e. non-metaphorically, expresses the speech function of giving information). Halliday brings together these various expressions under the heading of the notion of interpersonal metaphor of mood. The reason why these examples are regarded as metaphorical, lies in the fact that they deviate from the standard, most straightforward realization of a command by means of the imperative mood. Their metaphorical nature can be made clear by pointing to the literal meanings that these expressions have. For instance, (12a), at face-value, is basically a request for information: ‘could you send your proposal by email, or couldn’t you’? Similarly, at face-value, (12b) only refers to a statement: I state that I advise something to you. The metaphorical nature of such metaphors of mood is exploited in verbal play. A case in point is the well-known dinner-table example, where someone asks: Can you pass me the salt, please?, and the addressee answers, ‘Yes, I could certainly do that’, without undertaking any further action with regard to the salt. 4.5 Textual grammatical metaphor Halliday (1994) does not include this kind of grammatical metaphor in his stydy. Martin (1992) is the only systemic scholar who deals with metaphor from the textual perspective. He states that “ grammatical metaphor affects both the ideational and textual structure of the clause since it is a tool for organizing text” ( martin in Halliday & Martin 1993: 41) He believes that textual metaphors are logically oriented – they provide source for metaphorical realization of conjunctive relations: Meta-message relation: reason, factor, pointing out ... Text reference: this Negotiating texture: let me begin by... Internal conjunction: A number of reasons, for example, as a result.... 5 Nominalization 5.1 Taking process as thing In the congruent form of realization, a process should be realized by a verb. But in the incongruent form, a process can be represented as a thing, as in: [1a] First, she reviewed how the dorsal fin evolved. [1b] There was a first review of the evolution of the dorsal fin. This kind of metaphor has three functions. First, it can turn a dynamic process into a static entity through recategorization and provides us with a different way of construing the world. Second, it can increase the information load of the nominal group by nominalizing the dynamic process and putting several epithets before the head of the nominal group, and thus succeeds in condensing the information of the clause. Third, it can blur or cover up the actor by using nominalizations. 5.2 Taking quality as thing In the congruent form, quality is realized by adjectives. But in the incongruent form, it can be represented by a noun. That means that the speaker can take quality as thing, as in:[2a] I was not hungry to be free. [2b] I was not born with a hunger to be free. In this type of metaphor, quality can appear in the form of a circumstantial element or a participant. In the meantime, the original carrier can become the epithet of a participant and its role in the clause becomes less important. 3.5.3 Taking assessment as thing In the congruent form, assessment is expressed by modal verbs or modal adverbs. But in the incongruent form, it can be expressed by a noun as in: [3a] I achieved what I could. [3b] I achieved my potential. This kind of metaphor is termed interpersonal metaphor by Halliday. Modal adverbs differ not only in meaning but also in the attitudes taken by the speaker. However, all these modal verbs are colloquial and informal in style. Comparatively speaking, their corresponding nominalizations sound more formal. This difference can result in different interpersonal meanings, which can influence the establishment and maintenance of the interpersonal relationship between the speaker and the listener and affect the fulfillment of the goal of the verbal interaction. 6 Verbalization and grammatical metaphor By definition, verbalization refers to the language phenomenon that a non-process is taken as a process. 6.1 Taking temporal relation as process Two types of temporal relation: same time and different time. To express two or more than two events that happen at different time congruently, connectives are used. But this kind of temporal relation can also been taken as process and realized by verbs, as in: [1a] She left before I arrived. [2b] Her departure preceded my arrival. To express two or more than two events that happen at the same time congruently, connectives are used. But like the different-time type, this kind of temporal relation can also been taken as process and realized by verbs, as in: [2a] The strike took place last Monday. The party conference was held at the same time.[2b] The strike was timed to coincide with the party conference. To express the same or different time, the congruent forms tend to take the temporal relation as a logical element outside of the transitivity system. The incongruent forms, however, tend to encode this relation as a dynamic process. 6.2 Taking cause-effect relation as process To express cause-effect relation in the congruent way, connectives are used. But this kind of logical meaning can also been taken as process and realized by verbs, as in:[1a] Because he was careless, a traffic accident occurred. [2b] His carelessness caused a traffic accident. 6. 3 Taking condition as process To express the meaning of condition in the congruent way, connectives are used. But in the incongruent form, this meaning can be realized by verbs as in: [1a] If you have good food, exercises and enough sleep, you will have good health. [2b] Good health depends on good food, exercises and enough sleep. 6. 4 Taking concession as process To express the meaning of concession in the congruent way, connectives are used. But in the incongruent form, verbs can be used instead as in: [1a] I felt he was wrong, although I didn't say so at the time. [2b] My silence didn't mean that I felt he was right. 7 Summary In this paper, we have considered the notion of grammatical metaphor, as it is conceived of in the systemic functional model of language founded by Halliday. We have taken as our starting point the notion of metaphor as it is traditionally known, and re-labelled this notion as ‘lexical metaphor’ because it is concerned with the words, or the lexicon (vocabulary) of a language. Grammatical metaphor, as we have seen, can be explained in relation to lexical metaphor: it is based on the same metaphorical movement, but it is rooted in the grammar of a language, and thus exploits the grammatical resources of a language. Taking into account the general organization of these resources into different large metafunctions that language serves, we have seen how Halliday distinguished between ideational metaphors, which have to do with alternative ways of construing reality, and interpersonal metaphor, which offer alternative possibilities of expressing modal meanings (metaphors of modality), or exchanging commands (metaphors of mood). We also review how logical metaphor and textual metaphor are realized by Halliday and Martin. We conclude that: Grammatical metaphor is “a principle in which meanings may be cross-coded, phenomena represented by catergories other than those that evolve to present them” ( Halliday 1994). Lexical metaphor and grammatical metaphor are not two different phenomena; they are both aspects of the metaphorical strategy by which we expand our semantic resources for construing experience. Two types of realization between grammar and semantics are referred to as congruent and metaphorical. Grammatical metaphor can be classified into logical, experiential, interpersonal and textual metaphor. Nominalization and verbalization are essential in creating grammatical metaphor. In the chapter 3 we will explore how grammatical metaphor as a linguistic resource works in the description of emotion in English poetry. In the next session we will clear the concept of emotion ,metaphor emotion, and emotion in poetry. III. EMOTION AND POETRY 1 Introduction No aspect of our mental life is more important to the quality and meaning of our existence than emotions. They are what make life worth living, or sometimes ending. So it is not surprising that most of the great classical philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume--had recognizable theories of emotion, conceived as responses to certain sorts of events of concern to a subject, triggering bodily changes and typically motivating characteristic behavior. What is surprising is that in much of the twentieth-century philosophers of mind and psychologists tended to neglect them--perhaps because the sheer variety of phenomena covered by the word "emotion" and its closest neighbors tends to discourage tidy theory. In recent years, however, emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy, as well as in other branches of cognitive science. In view of the proliferation of increasingly fruitful exchanges between researches of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation from the approaches of other disciplines, particularly psychology, neurology and evolutionary biology. While it is quite impossible to do justice to those approaches here, some sidelong glances in their direction will aim to suggest their philosophical importance. 2 Basic emotion Most emotions have an intentional structure: we shall need to say something about what that means. Psychology and more recently evolutionary biology have offered a number of theories of emotions, stressing their function in the conduct of life. Philosophers have been especially partial to cognitivist theories, emphasizing analogies either with propositional judgments or with perception. But different theories implicitly posit different ontologies of emotion, and there has been some dispute about what emotions really are, and indeed whether they are any kind of thing at all. Emotions also raise normative questions: about the extent to which they can be said to be rational, or can contribute to rationality. In that regard the question of our knowledge of our own emotions is especially problematic, as it seems they are both the object of our most immediate awareness and the most powerful source of our capacity for self-deception. This results in a particularly ambivalent relation between emotions and morality. Traditionally, the three most common axes of the definition of emotion are: expression/ behaviour, physiological arousal, and subjective experience (Izard 1990; Myers 1989; Waters 1992). The splitting of evidence of emotions into physiological arousal, expression/ behaviour, and subjective experience allows different theorists to privilege one aspect over another, and this privileging is evident in most emotion theory in one way or another. Although there has been some debate over what the necessary and sufficient components of emotion are (Lazarus 1991; Clore & Ortony 1991), most theorists admit evidence from each of these categories, despite their stance on which is more primary. In recent years, some of other theories have been developed: James-Lange" theory of emotion (1884), Cognitive approach (Robert Solomon (1980), Jerome Neu (2000), Martha Nussbaum (2001) (Marks 1982), (Broad 1971; Lyons 1980), and (Oakley 1992), perceptual approach(Nussbaum 1990, Thomas 1989). However, there has not been any of these which is universally accepted and the choice of one of these definition depends on researchers and the field they involve. In this study we would like to introduce the definition by Kleinginna (1981): "Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated by neural/hormonal systems, which can: (a) give rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c)activate widespread physiological adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal directed, and adaptive" (Kleinginna 1981 p. 355). In the end, let us introduce the basic emotion introduced by Ortony and Turner (1990) and reinforced by Karin Sandstrom (2006) in the table below: Chart 4 : Basic emotion by Karin Sandstrom (2006) (Source: Linguistics in the Midnight Sun, report No 3) There is a notice that Karin has added fear as the sixth element of emotion in comparison with five ones by Ortony and Johnson ( sadness, happiness, love, anger, hate) 3 Emotion metaphor Before we continue, let us not forget that: “One of the major functions of metaphor is to express emotion” (Goatly 1997: 158). Emotion metaphors form an extensive group in the taxonomy of metaphors. The table below can summarize the conventional emotion metaphor. ( See next page) Metaphor +HAPPY-AS-UP+ ex. Myspiritsrose foremotions metaphor Metaphor for Metaphor for +ANGER-AS-BURDEN+ ex. He carries hisanger around with him. aspects of anger anger +ANGER-AS-DANGEROUS-ANIMAL+ ex. He unleashed hisanger. +ANGER-AS-FIRE+ex. What you said inflamed him. +ANGER-AS-HOT-CONTAINED-FLUID+ ex. You make myblood boil. +ANGER-AS-OPPONENT+ ex. I’ve been wrestlingwith myanger. +ANGER-AS-STORM+ ex. He thunderedwith rage. cause of anger +CAUSING-ANGER-AS-TRESPASSING+ ex. Leave mealone! Metaphor for Metaphor for +LUST-AS-HEAT+ex. She is an oldflame. aspects of aspects of +LUST-AS-HUNGER+ ex. Sheis quite adish. romanticlove sexualdesire +LUST-AS-INSANITY+ ex. I’m crazy in love with her. +LUST-AS-WAR+ ex. He’s known for his conquests. +LUSTFUL-PERSON-AS-ANIMAL+ ex.He’s a realstud. +SEXUALITY-AS-A-PHYSICAL-FORCE+ ex. We were drawn toeach other. Metaphor for +LOVE-AS-PATIENT+ ex. Theyhavea strong, healthy marriage. love +LOVE-AS-PHYSICAL-FORCE+ ex. His wholelife revolves around her. +LOVE-AS-BOND+ ex. There issomething between them. +LOVE-AS-CAPTIVE-ANIMAL+ ex. She letgo of herfeelings. +LOVE-AS-COMMODITY+ ex. I gaveher all mylove. +LOVE-AS-FIRE+ ex.My heart’son fire. +LOVE-AS-FLUID-IN-CONTAINER+ ex. Shewasfilledwithlove. +LOVE-AS-HIDDEN-OBJECT+ ex. You’reluckyto have found her. +LOVE-AS-INSANITY+ ex. I’m crazy about her. +LOVE-AS-JOURNEY+ ex. I don’tthink this relationshipis going anywhere. +LOVE-AS-MAGIC+ex.She is bewitching. +LOVE-AS-NATURAL-FORCE+ ex.She sweptme off myfeet. +LOVE-AS-NUTRIENT+ ex. She’sstarvedfor affection. +LOVE-AS-OPPONENT+ex. She wasovercome by love. +LOVE-AS-RAPTURE+ ex. I amgiddy with love. +LOVE-AS-UNITY+ ex. Wewere made foreach o