Study on impact of agency cost on firm performance of listed - Companies in Vietnamese stock maket

nies - Proposing recommendations for the limiting agency cosy tom improve firm performance of construction -listed companies. 3. Scope of research The study was conducted at 736 construction enterprises listed in two different Vietnamese stock exchanges, which are Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE), Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) and Unlisted Public Company Market(UPCOM) during the period of 6 years from 2010 to 2016. Besides, with the same duration, the impact of agency cost on firm performance of 108 construction-listed companies is studied. Based on goal of corporation (the final goal of business is maximizing the owners’ asset value), two variables are choosen, which reflect the financial efficiency to measure the firm performance. In details, ROA and ROE to reflect the firm performance in book value. The total asset turnover (TAT) and the proportion of management cost by total asset are choosen to be proxies of agency cosst. 3.Methodology Financial reporting data was collected from Stokplus company and several websites: https://www.vndirect.com.vn/portal/home.shtml; Quantitative method is used to test hypothesis reflecting the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. On the other hand, comparative, descriptive statistics, analysis, summary method are used to conclude this relationship. 4. New contributions of the Thesis Theoretical and conceptual framework is used to illustrate the role of agency cost and its impact on firm performance. On the other hand, the relationship between agency 3 cost, ownership structure and firm performance is highlighted in theoretical framework to depict the principles of corporate governance. Based on result of the study, there exist negative impact of agency cost on firm performance in some industries in vietnamese stock market. There is existence of relationship between agency cost on firm performance in construction-listed companies in Vietnamese stock market. Besides, state ownership impact firm performance arcording to inverted U Shape. Suggestions are information transparency and exercutive payment improvement. information transparency will limit asymetric information and increase firm efficiency. Exercutive payment plays important role to encourage managers. It will give managers an incentive to work harder, to persuade a target of corporation (maximize the wealth of stockholders) 4 CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Agency cost and the application of agency cost theory in business administration has received attention of academists in finance and economics for long. - Adam Smith addressed the potential conflict between owners and managers in his discussion of joint-stock companies’ operating efficiency - In 1932, agency problem was firstly mentioned by Berle and Means in their research of corporate ownership - In 1973, the article “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem” by Ross introduced an economic theory of agency problem. The author explained the essence of agency problem as efforts to establish an appropriate system of compensation motives to align managers’ behaviors with owners’ interest. - In 1973, Mitnick introduced a fundamental theory of organizational agency at American Political Science Association and in-depth studies of various aspects of agency theory. - In 1976, Jensen and Meckling developed measurement of agency problem in business enterprises as agency cost in their paper “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”. - Agency problem can also arise in pyramid ownership structure (Claessens et al., 2002) - In 2003, Morck and Yeung claimed that agency problem in “family-run” companies was as serious as it was in publicly traded companies. - In 2007, Ding et al. claimed that agency problem in state-owned companies was less serious than it was in privately held companies. 1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW OF DOMESTIC STUDIES In spite of numerous international studies of agency costs, research of agency costs in Vietnam, especially in the context of Vietnamese publicly traded companies, is highly limited. Most the relevant studies in Vietnam just concentrated on review of theoretical framework and empirical studies based on internationally established works. The only noteworthy article was probably “A study of agency costs of Vietnamese joint- 5 stock companies” by Vu Duy Hao and Tran Minh Tuan (2013), which specified several types of agency costs of Vietnamese listed joint-stock companies. Nevertheless, the work generally focuses on literature review of agency costs. In practice, the agency problem is yet to be particularly studied in the context of business enterprises with proportionally large state ownership. Meanwhile, for privately owned enterprises, there are still troubles with the separation of ownership and administration, which makes the agency problem even more complicated. 1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 1.3.1. Research gap - Recently, modern theories of agency problem and corporate governance of developed industrial Western countries are apparently yet to be comprehensively understood and reflected in practice. - In practice, the relationship between shareholders and managers is not appropriately resolved yet either. - Vietnamese studies of agency problem and corporate governance just provided the basic knowledge of agency costs. - There is no in-depth research of agency problem for Vietnamese listed companies of a certain industry so far. Therefore, it is necessary to have a study of agency costs’ influence operating efficiency of listed companies. 1.3.2. Research questions - How to identify agency costs of a business enterprise and their impact on the firm’s operating efficiency? - Is there an empirical relationship between agency costs, ownership structure and firm value? - How can managers reduce firm’s agency costs? 1.3.3. Model and research methodology This research based on the research of Ang et al (2000) and Singh và Davidson (2003) to choose the proxies of agency cost such as The total asset turnover (TAT) and the proportion of management cost by total asset. 6 To exercute empirical research, the research contribute models regarding impact of agency cost on firm performance: a. Model 1 For all listed companies in Vietnamese stock companies ROAit = β1 + β2Salassit + β3Exsait + β4Sizeit + β5Levit +β6Ageit + β7Industryi(1) ROEit = α1 + α2Salassit + α3Exsait + α4Sizeit + α5Levit +α6Ageit +α7Industryi(2) b. Model 2 ROAt = β1 + β2Salasst + β3Exsat + β4FCFt + β5Sizet + β6Levt + β7Aget + et (1) ROEt = β1 + β2Salasst + β3Exsat + β4FCFt + β5Sizet + β6Levt + β7Aget + et (2) c. Model 3 ROAit = β1 + β2Salassit + β3Exsait + β4FCFit + β5Sizeit + β6Levit + β7Ageit + εit ROEit = β1 + β2Salassit + β3Exsait + β4FCFit + β5Sizeit + β6Levit + β7Ageit + δit 7 CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF IMPACT OF AGENCY COST ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 2.1. The fundamentals of agency costs 2.1.1. The concept and classification of agency costs 2.1.1.1. The concept of agency costs The concept of agency costs can be explained as the costs which arise when there is lack of unanimity of managers’ and owners’ goals or managers’ and debtholders’ goals. In the former case, the agent is the manager working for the firm’s owners. As the firm’s owners can hardly supervise the managers’ behaviors on a regular basis, information asymmetry arises, which gives way for moral hazards and adverse selection. In the latter case, the agent acts on the behalf of the lender and assures financial obligations to be met, and agency costs arise when the managers and borrowers do not follow the contract in using their funds or invest in highly risky projects which affect interest and principal payment schedule. 2.1.1.2. Classification of agency costs - Monitoring Cost - Bonding Cost - Residual Loss 2.1.2 The relationship between corporate governance and agency costs According to previous researches, a firm with good corporate governance can reduce agency costs and improve operating efficiency (Black and Kim, 2012; Liu et al., 2015). Following the legal framework changes of South Korean business enterprises in 1999, Black and Kim (2012) found evidence of positive firm value effect of increasing number of Board of directors’ independent members. Similarly, 8 Liu et al. (2015) documented positive impact of board of management’s independence on firm’s operating efficiency of companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen (China) from 1999 to 2012. 2.1.3. Agency costs administration in business enterprises Based on legal framework of the economy and administration norms of the company, there are several approaches to agency cost administration as follows: - Organizational system-based approach - Internal control - External control - Legal-based system 2.1.4. Indicators of agency costs According to Khidma and Rehman (2014), there are 7 indicators to evaluate agency costs, which are free cash flow, asset turnover, operating expense ratio, administration expense ratio, advertising expense ratio, earnings volatility and total expenses. Besides, Ang et al. (2000), Davidson et al. (2006), asset turnover and administration expense-to-sales ratio are two significant indicators to assess agency costs. These two indicators are also widely used in studies of the relationship between state ownership and agency costs in foreign countries (Xu, Zhu and Lin, 2002; Singh and Davidson, 2003). Return on Asset (ROA) Return on equity (ROE) 2.3. The relationship between agency cost, ownership structure and operating efficiency With awareness of ownership structure diversity of publicly traded companies, many academists have touched upon the relationship between agency costs, ownership structure and operating efficiency of these firms. Besides, state ownership may be assumed to have negative influence on operating efficiency as it can lead to mandatory administration system and consumption of huge amount of capital. Foreign ownership may also affect firm’s 9 operating efficiency according to theories of agency problem. 2.4. The influence of agency costs In the sense of business administration, agency costs may have both positive and negative influences on Vietnamese companies’ operations. 2.4.1. Positive impact - The existence of agency costs is an obvious evidence of the company’s development in terms of both firm size and professionalism in control system. - Agency costs arise to maintain an efficient principal-agent relationship. Agency cost, as a part of firm’s costs in operations, proves the efficiency and professionalism of labor market. - As long as agency costs are properly administrated, they can help to improve firm’s operating efficiency and profitability, which maximizes shareholders’ value. - Agency costs assure fairness for both parties of agency contract on the basis that each of them bears a part of the costs. 2.4.2. Negative impact - Firm’s administration expenses increase. - One of the sources of agency costs is the existence of supervisors and constraints of the agents’ behaviors, which makes the firm’s operating system more multi-layered and complicated. - Another common negative effect of agency cost is the manipulation of the management’s power. 10 CHAPTER 3 EMPIRICAL RESULT OF IMPACT OF AGENCY COST ON FIRM PERFORMANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES 3.1. The operating efficiency of Vietnamese listed companies from 2010 to 2016 3.1.1. Operating efficiency of listed companies The overall performance of companies listed on Vietnam’s Stock Exchange was fairly good in 2010 and 2011 as their average ROA and ROE in this period were higher than before despite the downward trend (ROA and ROE in 2011 were lower than in 2010). This trend continued in 2012 and 2013. In 2014, ROA recovered and increased in 2015 while ROE reached the bottom in 2014 but increased substantially in 2015. Besides, the annual values of Salass variable were highly unstable, peaking in 2011 (1.306) and hitting the bottom in 1.204 in 2015. Meanwhile, the administration expense-to-sales ratio tended to rise over time. The Size variable followed similar trend. Finally, the financial leverage variable increased during 2010- 2013 but dropped thereafter. 3.1.2. Operating efficiency of construction companies From 2010 to 2016, construction companies in Vietnam had their ups-and- downs. From 2010 to 2014, due to financial crisis, they faced a lot of challenges as decreasing cash flows and operating efficiency. However, since 2014, listed construction companies in Vietnam improved their performance as real estate markets recovered. The recovery of real estate markets, together with more investment in infrastructure for transportation, better conditions for input price negotiation and participation in BOT, BT projects, helped leading firms in the industry to improve their profitability. 3.2. Agency cost of Vietnamese listed construction companies from 2010 to 2016 3.2.1. Sales-to-assets The total assets turnover of construction companies decreased throughout 2008- 2015, then increased in 2016. During the economic downturn, their inventories and receivables increased dramatically as a result of slower liquidation and payment 11 collection, hence substantially lower profitability. 3.2.2. Administration expense Although fixed assets turnover was not high, the administration expense-to- sales ratio of construction firms tended to increased from year to year, especially throughout 2008-2016, which partly explains profitability decrease during this period. These firms need to cut down this expense in order to enhance their profitability. 3.3. Empirical testing of agency costs‘ influence on operating efficiency of listed Vietnamese construction companies To test for the effect of agency costs on firms‘ operating efficiency, the industry effect was integrated into the model. The construction companies were selected as case study for firms listed on Vietnam’s Stock Exchange. 3.3.1 Empirical testing of agency costs‘ influence on operating efficiency of listed Vietnamese companies This research uses panel data analysis. This method helps to deal with the absence of unobservable firm-specific variables. Two following regression models are estimated: ROAit = β1 + β2 Salassit + β3 Exsait + β4 Sizeit + β5 Levit +β6 Ageit + β Industryi + εit ROEit = α1 + α Salassit + α Exsait + α Sizeit + α Levit +α Ageit + α Industryi + δit The regression’s outcomes: a) The effect of agency costs on firms’ operating efficiency Biến phụ thuộc ROA ROE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE Biến độc lập (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Salass 0.017** * 0.021** * 0.026** * 0.039** * 0.044** * 0.065** * (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) Exsa -0.037 - 0.147** * - 0.200** * -0.116 - 0.261** * - 0.518** * 12 Biến phụ thuộc ROA ROE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE Biến độc lập (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (0.038) (0.033) (0.042) (0.083) (0.089) (0.141) Size 0.009** * 0.011** * 0.030** * 0.017** * 0.019** * 0.067** * (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.018) Lev - 0.170** * - 0.169** * - 0.178** * - 0.137** * - 0.146** * - 0.183** * (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.056) Age 0.000** -0.000* - 0.006** * 0.000 -0.000 - 0.016** * (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) Industry2 0.005 0.014 0.011 0.019 (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.028) Industry3 0.009 0.016* 0.019 0.026 (0.008) (0.008) (0.027) (0.026) Industry4 0.020** 0.030** * 0.040 0.049* (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.027) Industry5 0.030** 0.049** * 0.056* 0.076** (0.012) (0.013) (0.032) (0.032) Industry6 0.002 0.011 0.013 0.020 (0.010) (0.011) (0.030) (0.030) Industry7 0.012 0.018* 0.021 0.026 (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.028) 13 Biến phụ thuộc ROA ROE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE Biến độc lập (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Industry8 -0.021* -0.013 -0.028 -0.020 (0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.029) Constant - 0.133** * - 0.174** * - 0.537** * - 0.366** * - 0.409** * - 1.303** * (0.041) (0.045) (0.132) (0.092) (0.098) (0.424) Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 R-squared 0.283 0.270 0.190 0.076 0.074 0.069 Kiểm định LM (pvalue) 2630.86 (0.000) 681.31 (0.000) Kiểm định Hausman (pvalue) 142.29 (0.000) 96.94 (0.000) b) Regression results, using instrumental variables Dependent variable ROA ROE VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Salass 0.083*** 0.153*** (0.019) (0.050) Exsa -3.014*** -6.934*** (0.541) (1.382) Size 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.034*** 0.029*** (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) Lev -0.199*** -0.265*** -0.186*** -0.354*** (0.016) (0.030) (0.040) (0.075) Age -0.000 0.001* -0.000 0.001 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Ind_dummy2 0.009 0.060** 0.016 0.136** (0.019) (0.027) (0.039) (0.068) Ind_dummy3 0.047** 0.014 0.086* 0.031 (0.019) (0.023) (0.044) (0.059) 14 Ind_dummy4 0.013 0.116*** 0.025 0.259*** (0.020) (0.030) (0.040) (0.073) Ind_dummy5 0.035* 0.270*** 0.061 0.607*** (0.021) (0.057) (0.041) (0.138) Ind_dummy6 -0.004 0.094*** -0.000 0.222*** (0.024) (0.034) (0.046) (0.082) Ind_dummy7 0.026 0.013 0.045 0.024 (0.020) (0.027) (0.041) (0.066) Ind_dummy8 -0.001 0.037 0.006 0.106 (0.023) (0.038) (0.046) (0.089) Constant -0.459*** -0.137 -0.936*** -0.380 (0.107) (0.114) (0.279) (0.261) Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 R-square 0.162 0.022 0.057 0.003 1st stage F test 33.321*** 39.862*** 33.321*** 39.862*** c) Financial leverage’s influence on the relationship between agency costs and firms’ operating efficiency Dependent variable ROA ROE coef dydx coef dydx VARIABL ES (1) (2) (3) (4) Salass 0.037 *** 0.027 *** 0.043 *** 0.065 *** (0.00 6) (0.00 4) (0.01 4) (0.01 0) Exsa - 0.250 ** - 0.203 *** - 0.433 - 0.510 15 *** (0.10 9) (0.04 6) (0.31 2) (0.16 1) Salass * Lev - 0.020 ** 0.042 (0.00 9) (0.02 8) Exsa * Lev 0.089 - 0.147 (0.19 5) (0.67 7) Size 0.031 *** 0.066 *** (0.00 6) (0.01 9) Lev - 0.158 *** - 0.226 *** (0.02 5) (0.07 9) Age - 0.006 *** - 0.016 *** (0.00 1) (0.00 2) Constan - 0.567 - 1.239 16 t *** *** (0.14 1) (0.45 6) Observa tions 4,416 4,416 R- squared 0.718 0.445 3.3.2. Empirical testing of agency costs‘ influence on operating efficiency of listed Vietnamese construction companies In this part, the influences of agency costs and ownership structure on operating efficiency of Vietnamese listed construction companies from 2010 to 2016. The sample includes 101 firms of construction industry which are listed on Hanoi’s Stock Exchange (HNX) and Ho Chi Minh City’s Stock Exchange (HoSE). The panel data are unbalanced as there are some missing data of certain variables in a few years. 3.3.2.1. The effect of agency costs on firms’ operating efficiency Regression models: ROAit = β1 + β2Salassit + β3Exsait + β4FCFit + β5Sizeit + β6Levit + β7Ageit + εit ROEit = β1 + β2Salassit + β3Exsait + β4FCFit + β5Sizeit + β6Levit + β7Ageit + δit The results are presented in the following table: Biến phụ thuộc ROA ROE FEM REM FEM REM (1) (2) (3) (4) Hệ số cắt 0.6392*** (0.1694) 0.1641** (0.0723) 1.0150* (0.5511) 0.0667 (0.1877) Salass 0.0221*** (0.0078) 0.0298 (0.0064) 0.1284*** (0.0253) 0.1202*** (0.0188) 17 Exsa -0.4557*** (0.0584) -0.3812*** (0.0518) -1.0479*** (0.1898) -0.8494*** (0.1564) FCF -0.0084 (0.0087) -0.0064 (0.0082) -0.0021 (0.0283) -0.0028 (0.0258) Size -0.0192*** (0.0064) -0.0013 (0.0027) -0.0324 (0.0207) 0.0032 (0.0070) Lev -0.1166*** (0.0262) -0.1424*** (0.0168) -0.1103 (0.0851) -0.1297*** (0.0455) Age 0.0228*** (0.0038) 0.0274*** (0.0034) 0.0942*** (0.0125) 0.0955*** (0.0107) Số quan sát 446 446 446 446 Kiểm định Hausman chi2(6) = 15.16 Prob > chi2 = 0.0190 chi2(6) = 15.64 Prob > chi2 = 0.0159 3.3.2.2. The influence of ownership structure on firm performance. Research models: ROAit = β1 + β5SO + β6SO2+ β7FO + β8SO2 + β9Sizeit + β10Levit + β11Ageit + εit (3.5) ROEit = β1 + β5SO + β6SO2+ β7FO + β8FO2 + β9Sizeit + β10Levit + β11Ageit + δit (3.6) The results are shown in the following table: Biến phụ thuộc ROA ROE FEM REM FEM REM (1) (2) (3) (4) Hệ số cắt 0.5481*** (0.1911) 0.1209 (0.0768) 1.2002* (0.6126) 0.1113 (0.2036) SO 0.1878*** (0.0581) 0.0641* (0.0359) 0.7844*** (0.1864) 0.2543** (0.1010) SO2 -0.2111*** (0.0685) -0.0359 (0.0529) -0.7782*** (0.2196) -0.1920 (0.1534) FO -0.3747*** (0.1048) -0.1809** (0.0905) -1.0151*** (0.3362) -0.4307 (0.2666) 18 FO2 0.5331* (0.2951) 0.4929** (0.2434) 1.8234* (0.9461) 1.1661 (0.7086) Size -0.0165** (0.0073) -0.0003 (0.0031) -0.0401* (0.0234) 0.0009 (0.0082) Lev -0.1326*** (0.0293) -0.1373*** (0.0194) -0.1673* (0.0941) -0.1080** (0.0538) Age 0.0255*** (0.0042) 0.0308*** (0.0038) 0.0956*** (0.0136) 0.1027*** (0.0118) Số quan sát 446 446 446 446 Kiểm định Hausman chi2(7) = 37.55 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 chi2(7) = 29.06 Prob > chi2 = 0.0001 3.3.2.3. The simultaneous effects of agency costs and ownership structure on operating efficiency Research models: ROAit = β1 + β2Salassit + β3Exsait + β4FCFit + β5SO + β6SO2+ β7FO + β8SO2 + β9Sizeit + β10Levit + β11Ageit + εit ROEit = β1 + β2Salassit + β3Exsait + β4FCFit + β5SO + β6SO2+ β7FO + β8FO2 + β9Sizeit + β10Levit + β11Ageit + δit Biến phụ thuộc ROA ROE FEM REM FEM REM (1) (2) (3) (4) Hệ số cắt 0.5370*** (0.1731) 0.1412* (0.0754) 0.7549 (0.5660) 0.0178 (0.2009) SO 0.0896* (0.0517) 0.0458 (0.0325) 0.4686*** (0.1690) 0.2225** (0.0914) SO2 -0.1258** (0.0602) -0.0304 (0.0471) -0.5051** (0.1970) -0.2033 (0.1376) 19 FO -0.3927*** (0.0914) -0.2098*** (0.0804) -1.0796*** (0.2989) -0.5384** (0.2395) FO2 0.5877** (0.2566) 0.4983** (0.2166) 1.9827** (0.8391) 1.1828* (0.6363) Salass 0.0205*** (0.0076) 0.0284*** (0.0064) 0.1183*** (0.0250) 0.1147*** (0.0188) Exsa -0.4544*** (0.0568) -0.3777*** (0.0513) -1.0272*** (0.1857) -0.8534*** (0.1544) FCF -0.0037 (0.0085) -0.0039 (0.0082) 0.0138 (0.0278) 0.0050 (0.0256) Size -0.0151** (0.0065) -0.0002 (0.0029) -0.0231 (0.0213) 0.0057 (0.0078) Lev -0.1245*** (0.0255) -0.1568*** (0.0176) -0.1393* (0.0835) -0.1852*** (0.0493) Age 0.0211*** (0.0038) 0.0266*** (0.0034) 0.0879*** (0.0123) 0.0941*** (0.0105) Số quan sát 446 446 446 446 Kiểm định Hausman chi2(10) = 38.5 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 chi2(10) = 25.23 Prob > chi2 = 0.0049 20 CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1. Discussion of results According to the research results, listed Vietnamese companies incurred agency costs in practice. However, the effect of agency costs on firms’ operating efficiency vary across industries. In case of listed construction companies, free cash flow and ownership structure variables were used to investigate the influence of agency costs on operating efficiency. The regression results of panel data show that agency costs have negative relationship with operating efficiency, which is similar to the theory of agency problem and relevant international and Vietnamese empirical studies before. Regarding the effect of ownership structure, foreign ownership was proven to have U- shaped relationship with operating efficiency. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the proportion of foreign ownership in ownership structure of construction companies. Besides, total assets turnover and administration expense ratio were proven to be appropriate indicators of agency costs of Vietnamese business enterprises. In addition, state ownership was found to have reverse U-shaped relationship with operating efficiency. The optimal level of state ownership was detected to be about 45% - 50%. The regression results also show that fi